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Optimal reserve price with three bidders

You sell one item by sealed-bid second-price auction to three bidders whose values are independent and uniform on [0,1][0, 1]. You may set a reserve price rr: bids below rr are ignored, and if exactly one bid is at least rr that bidder pays rr. Bidding one's value is still a dominant strategy. Choose rr to maximise your expected revenue (your own value for the item is 0). What is the maximum expected revenue, to four decimals?

Show hints (2)+
  1. With a reserve, the price is max⁡(second-highest value,r)\max(\text{second-highest value}, r) whenever the top value clears rr.
  2. Virtual value 2v−12v - 1: the optimal reserve is where it crosses zero, for any number of bidders.

Answer

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0.5313 (± 0.0005)

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