Splitting a fee with an impatient counterparty
You and a counterparty must split a $100 fee. You propose first; they accept or reject, and after a rejection they make the next proposal, and so on, with no limit on the number of rounds. Each round of delay shrinks what a dollar is worth: to you by a factor 0.9, to them by a factor 0.8. Both are fully rational and an offer that leaves the receiver indifferent is accepted. How many dollars do you get in equilibrium (to two decimals)?
Show hints (2)+
- The subgame after one rejection looks like the original with roles swapped: use stationary shares.
- Each proposer offers the responder exactly the discounted value of the responder's own next proposal.
Answer
Reveal answer →Final answer
71.43 (± 0.01)
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